

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 BISSAU 0194

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TAGS: PFOR AMGT PU
SUBJ: PARM - ANNUAL POLICY AND RESOURCE ASSESSMENT PART 1
GUINEA BISSAU

REF: A) CERP 0001, B) STATE 061301

SUMMARY. THERE FOLLOWS THE EMBASSY'S SUBMISSION FOR THIS YEAR'S POLICY PLANNING CYCLE WHICH REPRESENTS FIRST ATTEMPT INCLUDE GUINEA-BISSAU IN PLANNING CYCLE SINCE EMBASSY OPENED IN JUNE 1976. SUBMISSION SHOULD BE VIEWED THEREFORE AS INITIAL STATEMENT IN POLICY PROCESS WHICH WRITTEN WITHOUT REFERENCE TO ANY PREVIOUS COUNTRY SPECIFIC PLANNING DOCUMENT OR SET OF INTERESTS, OBJECTIVES, COURSES OF ACTION, ETC. ASSESSMENT WRITTEN WITHOUT CONSULTATION WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF AID OR USIA WHICH FIGURE IN THE RECOMMENDED COURSES OF ACTION AND RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS. SUBMISSION SHOULD BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH SUBMISSION ON CAPE VERDE (SEPTEL) TO WHICH RESOURCE SECTIONS INTEGRALLY RELATED. END SUMMARY.

1. POLICY ASSESSMENTS

A. U.S. INTERESTS: THE UNITED STATES HAS LITTLE DIRECT LONG-TERM INTEREST IN GUINEA-BISSAU. WE HAVE NEITHER A COMMERCIAL OR FINANCIAL STAKE NOR AN APPRECIABLE RESIDENT COMMUNITY OF AMERICAN CITIZENS TO PROTECT. WHILE WE DO HAVE AN INTEREST IN ACCESS TO
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GUINEA-BISSAU'S POTENTIAL MINERAL RESOURCES (OIL, BAUXITE, ILMENITE, ETC.) THERE IS AS YET LITTLE CONCRETE EVIDENCE AS TO THE COMMERCIAL VALUE OF THESE MINERAL DEPOSITS. GUINEA-BISSAU'S IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC QUESTIONS IMPORTANT TO US IS NEGLIGIBLE OUTSIDE ITS LONE VOTE IN THE UNITED NATIONS, THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL BODIES. EVEN IN AFRICA WHERE THE GOVERNMENT'S REPUTATION AS A

PROGRESSIVE YET PRAGMATIC SUCCESSOR TO A SUCCESSFUL LIBERATION MOVEMENT LED MANY TO BELIEVE ITS VOICE WOULD CARRY WEIGHT DIS- PROPORTIONATE TO ITS SIZE, THE UNIMAGINATIVE CONDUCT OF ITS POST- INDEPENDENCE FOREIGN POLICY HAS ROBBED IT OF NOTICEABLE IMPACT. THE U.S. DOES HAVE, HOWEVER, AN INDIRECT LONG-TERM INTEREST IN PROMOTING GUINEAN POLICIES WHICH COINCIDE WITH OUR CONTI- NENTAL INTERESTS OF DECREASING ARMS TRANSFERS, DENYING BASES TO THE SOVIET UNION AND AVOIDING REGIONAL CONFLICTS WHICH HAVE THE POTENTIAL FOR ESCALATION. IN EACH OF THESE AREAS, THE KEY FACTOR IS SOVIET INFLUENCE. THAT SOVIET INFLUENCE IN GUINEA-BISSAU BE DECREASED IS IN THE U.S. INTEREST TO PREVENT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A POTENTIALLY HOSTILE STRATEGIC BASE AND TO PREVENT REGIONAL CONFLICTS WHICH COULD BOTH BE DETERMENTAL TO U.S. INTERESTS IN NEIGHBORING STATES AND WHICH PRESENT DANGERS OF EXTRACONTINEN- TAL INVOLVEMENT.

B. OVERVIEW: GUINEA-BISSAU HAS BEEN INDEPENDENT ONLY A SHORT TIME AND ITS GOVERNMENT IS STILL IN ITS SHAKE-DOWN PHASE. DURING THIS TRANSITIONAL PHASE, NEW OPTIONS ARE BEING EXPLORED, NEW IDEAS ON PARTY ORGNIZATION TESTED, A DEVELOPMENT PLAN IS BEING CONCEIVED AND A PATTERN OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IS BEING ES- TABLISHED. FUNDAMENTAL DECISIONS WILL BE TAKEN AT THE UPCOMING THIRD PARTY CONGRESS NOW SCHEDULED TO BE HELD IN BISSAU IN JULY 1977. PRESIDENT CABRAL HAS ADMITTED THAT THE PAIGC IS STILL ORGANIZED AS A LIBERATION MOVEMENT AND MUST UNDERGO SUB- STANTIAL SURGERY TO TRANSFORM ITSELF INTO A POLITICAL PARTY CAPABLE OF GOVERNING THE COUNTRY. THE CONGRESS WILL ALSO PROBABLY LAY DOWN GUIDELINES FOR A STRATEGY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. THE EMBASSY EXPECTS THE CONGRESS WILL RATIFY THE PRAGMATIC AND OPEN APPROACH TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT UNDERTAKEN BY THE CONFIDENTIAL

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REGIME SINCE INDEPENDENCE BUT WILL ENUNCIATE RADICAL STATUTES FOR PARTY ORGANIZATION WHICH, WHILE SHORT OF DECLARING GUINEA- BISSAU MARXIST-LENINIST, WILL CLEARLY PLACE THE COUNTRY AMONG AFRICA'S MORE RADICAL STATES. THIS RADICAL ORIENTATION WILL CONTINUE TO BE REFLECTED IN GUINEA-BISSAU'S POSITIONS ON INTER- NATIONAL POLITICAL ISSUES WHICH WE CAN EXPECT TO REMAIN BASICALLY HOSTILE TO U.S. POSITIONS. WHILE INCREASING DEPENDENCE ON WESTERN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE MAY LEAD TO GREATER ACCESS FOR WESTERN IDEAS, GUINEA-BISSAU'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP WILL BE LOATHE TO ADMIT ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN THIS AND ITS INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL STANCE.

THE NEXT FEW YEARS IS LIKELY TO SEE A CONSOLIDATION OF THE PAIGC'S SUPPORT THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY AND A LESSENING OF CONCERN FOR THE SECURITY THREATS REPRESENTED BY FORMER PORTUGUESE ARMY COMMANDOS. AS A RESULT, THE INFLUENCE OF THE STATE SECURITY APPARATUS NOW HEAVILY UNDER SOVIET AND CUBAN INFLUENCE CAN BE EXPECTED TO DECREASE.

THE PURSUIT OF AN OPEN DEVELOPMENT POLICY HAS HAD AND WILL

CONTINUE TO LEAD TO MORE FREQUENT CONTACTS WITH WESTERN AID DONORS. GUINEA-BISSAU NOW DEPENDS FAR MORE ON THE WEST THAN THE EAST FOR ITS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN EVERY FIELD BUT SECURITY. THIS TREND MAY EVEN BE ACCELERATED AS GUINEA-BISSAU BECOMES DISILLUSIONED WITH THOSE FEW ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROJECTS UNDERTAKEN BY COMMUNIST COUNTRIES. THE COMMITMENTS OF THE ARABS BOTH BILATERALLY AND AS A RESULT OF THE AFRO-ARAB SUMMIT HAVE GIVEN GUINEA-BISSAU LITTLE REASON TO CHANGE ITS POSITION ON THE MIDDLE-EAST. IF THESE COMMITMENTS CAN BE TRANSLATED INTO CONCRETE PROJECTS IN GUINEA-BISSAU, THE ARAB STAR WILL RISE EVEN HIGHER.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 BISSAU 0194

OFFICIAL RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, NOW EXPERIENCING DIFFICULTY BECAUSE OF SEVERE DISAGREEMENTS OVER FISHING, MAY IMPROVE IF THE SOVIETS CAN RESOLVE TO BE MORE GENEROUS IN THEIR DEALINGS WITH THE GUINEANS. THE DEPARTURE OF SOVIET AMBASSADOR SEMIONOV, CLOSELY IDENTIFIED IN GUINEAN EYES WITH THE UNFAVORABLE FISHING AGREEMENT, SHOULD HELP IMPROVE THE SOVIET IMAGE.

GUINEA-BISSAU'S RELATIONS WITH SENEGAL WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT AS BISSAU LOOKS TO DAKAR'S COMPARATIVELY IMPRESSIVE ARRAY OF SERVICES AND INFRASTRUCTURE. GUINEA-BISSAU HAS PLACED HIGH PRIORITY ON CONVINCING THE FED TO FINANCE AN ALL WEATHER ROAD BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. GUINEA-BISSAU WOULD ALSO LIKE TO SEE AN IMPROVEMENT IN ITS CURRENTLY STRAINED RELATIONS WITH CONAKRY. THE TWO OUTSTANDING ISSUES -- SEKOU TOURE'S DISPLEASURE OVER BISSAU'S WARM RELATIONS WITH DAKAR AND BISSAU'S REFUSAL OF CONAKRY'S DEMAND FOR EXTRADITION OF FOULAH REFUGEES -- WILL LIKELY HOWEVER CONTINUE TO FOUL THE

AIR BETWEEN THEM FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

THE POTENTIALLY MOST DESTABILIZING PROBLEM FACING GUINEA-BISSAU AND THEREFORE WITH THE GREATEST POTENTIAL TO AFFECT U.S. INTERESTS IS THE QUESTION OF WHAT TO DO WITH GUINEA-BISSAU'S OUTSIZED ARMED FORCES. ITS SOME 10,000 SOLDIERS HAVE LESS
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AND LESS TO DO AS THE SECURITY SITUATION IMPROVES YET THEY CONTINUE TO CONSUME A LARGE PART OF THE NATIONAL BUDGET. ATTEMPTS AT DEMOBILIZATION HAVE SO FAR BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL AS THE STILL WAR-SHATTERED ECONOMY IS UNABLE TO ABSORB THE ILLITERATE GUERRILLAS WHO, HAVING WON THE WAR, NOW EXPECT THEIR REWARD. THE FUTURE OF THE ARMED FORCES IS COMPLICATED BY THE HEAVY SOVIET AND CUBAN INFLUENCE. ALL MILITARY EQUIPMENT IS FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND ADVISORS ARE EITHER RUSSIAN OR CUBAN. ATTEMPTS TO REDUCE THE SIZE OF THE ARMY WILL BE SEEN AS AN ATTEMPT TO DECREASE SOVIET/CUBAN INFLUENCE. FURTHER COMPLICATING THE SITUATION IS THE RESENTMENT FELT BY MANY OF THE ARMY RANK AND FILE AND LOWER-LEVEL OFFICERS AT THE PREDOMINANCE OF CAPE VERDEANS IN THE OFFICER'S CORPS. DEMOBILIZATION, FREQUENT PAY LAPSES, AND RACISM IN THE RANKS MAKE THE FUTURE OF THE ARMED FORCES POTENTIALLY VOLATILE. FOR THE MOMENT, DEFENSE MINISTER JOAO BERNARDO VIEIRA SEEMS TO HAVE THE SITUATION IN HAND. AS A GUINEAN, HOWEVER, HE COULD BE TEMPTED TO USE AFRICAN RESENTMENT AT CAPE VERDEAN DOMINANCE OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE PARTY TO PROPEL HIM TO POWER. THE RESULT OF SUCH AN EVENTUALITY FOR U.S. INTERESTS IS UNCLEAR.

IN THE LIKELY ABSENCE OF ANY FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN GUINEA-BISSAU'S POLICIES OR POLITICAL MAKE-UP OVER THE NEXT ONE TO TWO YEARS, THOSE FACTORS WHICH WILL MOST DIRECTLY AFFECT GUINEA-BISSAU'S PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. IN THIS TIME FRAME WILL BE OUR PERFORMANCE IN BILATERAL RELATIONS, PRINCIPALLY ON THE AID FRONT, AND OUR POLICIES AND ACTIONS CONCERNING SOUTHERN AFRICA.

ON THE LATTER POINT, PRESIDENT CABRAL HAS ADMITTED OF THE USEFULNESS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN EFFORTS TO FIND A PEACEFUL ROAD FOR THE TRANSITION TO MAJORITY RULE BUT HAS ALSO FIRMLY INDICATED THAT GUINEA-BISSAU BELIEVES ARMED STRUGGLE IS THE ONLY WAY SUCCESS CAN BE OBTAINED AND WILL BACK IT TO THE EXTENT OF ITS CAPABILITIES.

C. OBJECTIVES AND COURSES OF ACTION: OBJECTIVES AND RELATED
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COURSES OF ACTION ARE PRESENTED IN DESCENDING ORDER OF PRIORITY:

1. DISPEL RESERVOIR OF SUSPICION OF U.S.: THERE IS LITTLE HISTORY OF U.S. OFFICIAL CONTACT WITH GUINEA-BISSAU'S LEADERSHIP WHICH SPENT OVER TWELVE YEARS FIGHTING AGAINST PORTUGAL, A U.S. ALLY. AS A RESULT, PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. HELD BY THE COUNTRY'S LEADERSHIP ARE OFTEN DISTORTED AND SOMETIMES EXCESSIVELY COLORED BY THE ANTI-U.S. RELATIONS OF THE WAR YEARS. DISPELLING THIS SUSPICION SO THAT OUR REPRESENTATIONS AND ACTIONS CAN BE TAKEN AT FACE VALUE IS A PREREQUISITE TO THE FURTHERANCE OF OUR INTERESTS AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF OUR OTHER OBJECTIVES.

RECOMMENDED COURSES OF ACTION:

-- ESTABLISH CONTACTS WITH WIDE RANGE OF GOVERNMENT AND PARTY LEADERS WHO HAVE NEVER BEFORE HAD OFFICIAL AMERICAN CONTACTS. THE RAPID APPOINTMENT OF AN AMBASSADOR IS CRUCIAL TO THE SUCCESSFUL PURSUIT OF THIS COURSE OF ACTION.

-- MAINTAIN LOW-KEY APPROACH TO U.S. OPERATIONS ALREADY ESTABLISHED BUT BEGIN AN ACCELERATING PROGRAM OF INFORMATION ACTIVITIES TO PUBLICIZE THE NATURE OF U.S. ACTIVITIES. TO THAT END, A MODEST USIA BUDGET SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED FOR USE BY THE EMBASSY AND USIA OFFICIALS EITHER FROM NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES OR FROM WASHINGTON SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED TO OCCASIONALLY VISIT BISSAU TO ORIENT THE USE OF THIS BUDGET.

-- INCREASE CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS TO BEGIN INTRODUCING GREATER NUMBERS OF GUINEA-BISSAU OPINION LEADERS AND FUTURE LEADERS TO THE U.S. TO THAT HEND, THE CULTURAL EXCHANGE BUDGET SHOULD BE INCREASED.

-- CONTINUE TO USE THE AID AND SELF-HELP PROGRAMS TO ESTABLISH EMBASSY CONTACTS AT HIGH LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT. ACCESS TO THE NUMBER THREE MAN IN THE GOVERNMENT, AND TOP PARTY IDEOLOGUE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COMMISSIONER VASCO CABRAL, CAN BE ACHIEVED THIS WAY.
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2. KEEP GUINEA-BISSAU FREE OF FOREIGN BASES: AT THE MOMENT, THE U.S. HAS LITTLE STRATEGIC INTEREST IN GUINEA-BISSAU BUT WE ARE CONCERNED THAT GUINEA-BISSAU'S TERRITORY MIGHT BE USED TO ESTABLISH SOVIET AIR AND/OR NAVAL FACILITIES OR THAT THE GOGB WOULD CONSENT TO SOVIET USE OF EXISTING FACILITIES. THE PAIGC'S STATED POLICY IS THAT GUINEA-BISSAU IS NON-ALIGNED AND THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FOREIGN BASES WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH NON-ALIGNMENT. SHORT OF ACCEDING TO SOVIET REQUESTS FOR FACILITIES, THE GOGB HAS PERMITTED SOVIET USE OF ITS INTERNATIONAL CLASS AIRPORT FOR THE AIR SHUTTLE TO ANGOLA AND HAS RECENTLY PERMITTED THE VISIT OF A SOVIET DESTROYER.

RECOMMENDED COURSES OF ACTION:

-- WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO CAREFULLY ENUNCIATE OUR ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-ALIGNMENT AS A BASIS FOR A COUNTRY'S FOREIGN POLICY BUT SHOULD POINT OUT THAT WE WOULD VIEW SOVIET BASE RIGHTS AS COMPLETELY INCONSISTENT WITH THAT PRINCIPLE.

-- THE PRINCIPLE REPORTING OBJECTIVE OF THE EMBASSY SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE TO CLOSELY ANALYZE SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN GUINEA-BISSAU WITH A VIEW TO PROVIDING AN EARLY WARNING SHOULD THE PAIGC CHANGE ITS POLICY AND PERMIT BASE CONSTRUCTIONS.

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3. DISCOURAGE AN ESCALATION IN ARMS TRANSFERS TO GUINEA-BISSAU:
THE GUINEA-BISSAU ARMED FORCES, SOME 10,000 STRONG, WITH ITS FOUR MIG-17'S, STALIN ORGANS AND PERHAPS A SCORE OF RUSSIAN TANKS IS A DESTABILIZING FORCE IN THE REGION. RECENT SENEGALESE REQUESTS TO THE U.S. FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE CAN IN PART BE ATTRIBUTED TO THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT GUINEA-BISSAU'S INTENTIONS. NEITHER THE U.S. NOR ANY OF ITS ALLIES CURRENTLY SUPPLY ARMS TO GUINEA-BISSAU WHICH IS 100 PERCENT DEPENDENT IN THIS DOMAIN ON THE SOVIET UNION.

RECOMMENDED COURSES OF ACTION:

-- WHILE WE WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO BE SUCCESSFUL IN RESTRAINING THE SOVIETS DIRECTLY WE SHOULD, BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION IT IS NOT THE ARM ITSELF WHICH IS DESTABILIZING BUT RATHER THE MOTIVES OF AN INFLUENCE UPON THE OWNERQR ENCOURAGE THE RECENT GUINEA-BISSAU INTEREST IN BEGINNING A PROGRAM OF

MILITARY COOPERATION WITH PORTUGAL. OPEN U.S. INTEREST IN NURTURING THIS RELATIONSHIP WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE BUT WE SHOULD CONSIDER APPROACHING THE PORTUGUESE ON THIS MATTER WITH A VIEW TO ENCOURAGING THEIR RECEPTIVITY TO MILITARY COOPERATION WITH A FORMER COLONY.

-- WE SHOULD CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO REPORT ON SOVIET ARMS
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TRANSFERS TO GUINEA-BISSAU AND TO THAT END WE SHOULD FOLLOW UP ON THE DEFENSE ATTACHE VISIT IN MARCH AND CONSIDER REQUESTING HIS ACCREDITATION IN BISSAU.

4. ATTEMPT TO INTRODUCE MORE FLEXIBILITY INTO GUINEA-BISSAU'S MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY: SINCE GAINING INDEPENDENCE AND JOINING VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, GUINEA-BISSAU HAS OPPOSED US ACROSS THE BOARD ON ISSUES DEEMED IMPORTANT TO US. DURING THE LAST U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND PRIOR TO SEVERAL OTHER INTERNATIONAL GATHERINGS (NAM, OAU, ETC.), WE HAVE HAD OCCASION TO BEGIN A DIALOGUE WITH GUINEA-BISSAU ON THESE ISSUES. WE HAVE EMPHASIZED PUERTO RICO AND QUESTIONS REGARDING ISRAELI MEMBERSHIP IN THE UN AND UNESCO.

RECOMMENDED COURSES OF ACTION:

-- WE SHOULD CONTINUE OUR ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE ON ISSUES IMPORTANT TO US BUT SHOULD BE SELECTIVE IN CHOOSING THEM. WE HAVE LITTLE HOPE OF MOVING GUINEA-BISSAU ON MIDDLE-EAST QUESTIONS WHERE THEY IDENTIFY WITH THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND IN VIEW OF THEIR HOPES FOR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE ARABS. LIKEWISE, GUINEA-BISSAU WILL REMAIN COMMITTED TO THE MORE RADICAL POSITION ON SOUTHERN AFRICAN QUESTIONS. WE WILL HAVE A SLIGHT CHANCE OF SUCCESS ON ISSUES SUCH AS PUERTO RICO AND GUAM AND IT IS THERE WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE OUR EFFORTS.

-- WE MUST BEGIN AT THE BEGINNING WITH GUINEA-BISSAU'S DIPLOMATS AND DECISION-MAKERS FOR WHOM COMPLEX NON-AFRICAN POLITICAL SUBJECTS ARE NEW. WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO PROVIDE BACKGROUND DOCUMENTATION IN PORTUGUESE OR FRENCH ON WHATEVER ISSUE WE SERIOUSLY INTEND TO LOBBY.

-- ON A HIGHLY SELECTIVE BASIS, WE SHOULD CONSIDER ESCALATING DISCUSSION OF VITAL QUESTIONS TO THE PRESIDENCY WHERE MORE MODERATE VIEWS MAY PREVAIL.

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5. SUPPORT GUINEA-BISSAU'S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT:
IN KEEPING WITH THE CONGRESSIONALLY MANDATED EMPHASIS ON
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE RURAL POOR, AID'S PROGRAMMING IN
GUINEA-BISSAU HAS CONCENTRATED IN AGRICULTURE AND EDUCATION.
WE HAVE A HUMANITARIAN INTEREST IN HELPING THE POOREST SECTORS
OF GUINEA-BISSAU SOCIETY PULL THEMSELVES UP. SINCE
GUINEA-BISSAU'S DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES ARE ALSO CONCENTRATED
IN RURAL ASSISTANCE AND IN VIEW OF THE GOVERNMENT'S STATED
POLICY OF ACCEPTING DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FROM ALL QUARTERS,
WE SHOULD HAVE NO TROUBLE IN MOUNTING AN EFFECTIVE PROGRAM.

RECOMMENDED COURSES OF ACTION:

-- WE SHOULD MOVE IMMEDIATELY TO FILL THE COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT
OFFICER SLOT FOR GUINEA-BISSAU. THE ABSENCE OF ANY AID
OFFICER IN BISSAU HAS CRIPPLED THE AID PROGRAM. THE PROPOSED
ASSIGNMENT OF AN IDI SHOULD GIVE SUFFICIENT DEPTH TO THE
COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT OFFICE TO CARRY OUT ITS PROGRAMMING
RESPONSIBILITIES.

-- THE PROPOSED LEVEL OF ASSISTANCE TO GUINEA-BISSAU OF ABOUT
DOLS 1,000,000 YEARLY SEEMS ABOUT RIGHT. THE ABSORPTIVE
GAP FOR QUALITY PROJECTS IS WIDENING. THE IMPORTANT POINT,
I.E., THAT IT IS THE WEST NOT THE EAST THAT IS HELPING GUINEA-
BISSAU TO DEVELOP, IS BEING AMPLY MADE BY THE SIGNIFICANT
EFFORT BEING MADE BY OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES (SWEDEN, THE
NETHERLANDS, AND FRANCE, IN PARTICULAR).

-- INITIAL GOGB INTEREST IN THE PEACE CORPS SHOULD BE VIGOROUSLY
FOLLOWED UP. EVEN IF ESTABLISHED ONLY IN ENGLISH TEACHING,
PEACE CORPS ACTIVITIES WILL ADD AN IMPORTANT HUMAN DIMENSION
TO OUR ASSISTANCE EFFORTS.

-- THE SELF-HELP FUND, WITH SUBSTANTIAL IMPACT AT LOW COST,
SHOULD BE EXPANDED BEYOND ITS CURRENT TOKEN LEVEL. AN IN-
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CREASE TO DOLS 50,000 IN FY 78 SHOULD BE FOLLOWED BY AN
INCREASE TO DOLS 100,000 IN FY 79.

6. PROMOTE U.S. BUSINESS INTERESTS: THE GUINEA-BISSAU MARKET
FOR U.S. EXPORTS IS SMALL AND PRESENTS SERIOUS LANGUAGE DIFFICULTIES
FOR U.S. EXPORTERS. ON THE OTHER HAND, AID FLOWS,
ESTIMATED BY THE UNDP TO BE AS MUCH AS DOLS 200,000,000
BETWEEN NOW AND 1981, OFFER A NUMBER OF POSSIBILITIES FOR U.S.
BUSINESSMEN.

-- WE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO INVOLVE U.S. FIRMS IN COMPETITIVE

BIDDING FOR CONTRACTS WHICH WILL BE LET BY INTERNATIONAL
FINANCING INSTITUTIONS.

-- WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO ASSIST THOSE U.S. BANKS WHICH HAVE
ALREADY BECOME INVOLVED IN PROJECT FINANCING.
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